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Privacy Beyond Possession:  
Solving the Access Conundrum in 
Digital Dollars 
ABSTRACT 
The advent of a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) could 
reshape the US payments system. A retail CBDC would be a digital 
representation of the US dollar in the form of an account or token that 
is widely accessible to the general public. It would be a third form of US 
fiat money that is created and issued by the Federal Reserve and 
complementary to physical cash. CBDC proposals have suggested a 
myriad of retail CBDC design models with an overwhelming interest in 
a retail CBDC that either implements a centralized ledger system or 
some form of a distributed ledger system to process payments. The 
technology of a retail CBDC would enable instantaneous payments  
for consumers and greater transparency for government officials. 
Additionally, CBDC proponents are championing retail CBDC as a tool 
to promote financial inclusion. However, antiquated US privacy 
protections may be inadequate to safeguard against the potential risks 
to individual privacy within digital payments and consequently 
undermine financial inclusion. A retail CBDC system that is under the 
control of the Federal Reserve could bolster regulatory compliance and 
oversight but also exacerbate workarounds by government entities in the 
current US privacy framework that are concerning for individual 
privacy in the age of big data and dataveillance. A proper privacy 
framework governing retail CBDC records would alleviate risks to 
privacy and enhance public trust in a retail CBDC system. Refining the 
Privacy Act of 1974 or creating a new regulatory framework that is 
informed by both the Privacy Act and the impact of innovative data 
analytics would help balance the inherent tension between privacy and 
transparency of user identity and transactions within a retail CBDC 
system under the control of the Federal Reserve. 
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Central banks around the world have undertaken various roles 
in promoting innovative digital payment solutions to advance several 
objectives, including financial inclusion and efficiency.1 Relatedly, the 
rise of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, has demonstrated the need for 
a resilient digital currency in the global economy. Yet, the proliferation 
of cryptocurrency has sparked concerns about competition from private 
currencies and the privatization of monetary policy.2 In 2019, Facebook 
was met with legislative and regulatory scrutiny when it announced a 
plan to develop Libra3—a price-stabilized cryptocurrency (also known 
as stablecoin) whose value is tied to a set of existing government-issued 
currencies.4 COVID-19 has further highlighted the shortcomings of 
antiquated financial systems and accelerated central banks’ exploration 
 
 1. See Michael S. Barr, Adrienne A. Harris, Lev Menand & Wenqi (Michael) Xu, Building 
the Payment System of the Future: How Central Banks Can Improve Payments to Enhance  
Financial Inclusion 23–27 (Univ. of Mich. Ctr. on Fin., L. & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 3, 2020). 
 2. See John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, FedAccounts: Digital Dollars, 89 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 115 (2021) [hereinafter FedAccounts]. 
 3. Clare Duffy, Facebook Gets More Official Pushback on Libra, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/03/tech/facebook-libra-us-lawmakers/index.html [https://perma.cc 
/M5UR-N72A] (last updated July 9, 2019, 4:28 PM).   
 4. See LIBRA ASS’N MEMBERS, WHITE PAPER V2.0, at 2 (2020), https://wp.diem.com/en-
US/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2020/04/Libra_WhitePaperV2_April2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4PVQ-KFPS]. Libra Coins consist of a multicurrency coin and single-currency stablecoins. Id. 
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of innovative payment solutions, most notably central bank digital 
currency (CBDC).5 
Specifically, central banks are exploring the concept of retail 
CBDC (or general purpose CBDC), which would be a digital form of fiat 
currency that is created and issued by a country’s monetary authority, 
the liability of the monetary authority, and widely accessible to the 
general public.6 A retail CBDC would function as an additional option 
to physical cash. This form of digital currency would modernize the US 
banking infrastructure by leveraging innovative technology to extend 
access to central bank money. The United States is confronting the need 
to reform its banking system not only to move towards a technologically 
advanced future and address lingering financial inclusion issues but 
also to join the global exploration of CBDC. The COVID-19 Pandemic 
(particularly the prolonged delay of stimulus payments) has 
demonstrated the clear need for critical government infrastructures to 
expand the functionality and utility of the dollar.7 The US financial 
system currently excludes 6.5 percent of US households from the 
mainstream banking system (the unbanked population) and fails to 
serve the financial needs of 18.7 percent of US households (the 
underbanked population).8 A retail CBDC could alleviate barriers to 
 
 5. See Paul Wong & Jesse Leigh Maniff, Comparing Means of Payment: What Role for a 
Central Bank Digital Currency?, FEDS NOTES (Aug. 13, 2020), https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-
7172.2739 [https://perma.cc/V9BQ-E7G9] (“The COVID-19 pandemic has also led central banks to 
think further about potential enhancements to the general safety and efficiency of payment  
systems, including developing a digital currency”); see also Caitlin Reilly, Delayed COVID-19 Aid 
Spurs Search for Faster Payments, ROLL CALL (June 23, 2020, 6:59 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/ 
2020/06/23/delayed-covid-19-aid-spurs-search-for-faster-payments/ [https://perma.cc/JL4S-
QAKJ]. 
 6. CODRUTA BOAR & ANDREAS WEHRLI, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS PAPERS NO. 
114, READY, STEADY, GO? – RESULTS OF THE THIRD BIS SURVEY ON CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL 
CURRENCY 4 (2021) [hereinafter BIS SURVEY]. 
 7. Chris Brummer, Agnes N. Williams Rsch. Professor & Fac. Dir., Georgetown  
Inst. of Int’l Econ. L., Remarks at Digital Dollar Live, at 12:07 (July 21, 2020),  
in ACCENTURE, https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-130/Accenture-Digital-Dollar-Live-
Video-Transcript.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/U8DD-GNNT]; see also OUSMÈNE JACQUES 
MANDENG & JOHN VELISSARIOS, ACCENTURE, THE (R)EVOLUTION OF MONEY II: BLOCKCHAIN 
EMPOWERED CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (2019), https://www.accenture.com/_acnme-
dia/PDF-105/Accenture-Revolution-of-Money-II-2019.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/VUN6-
ZME3]. 
 8. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 17 (2018), https://www.economicinclusion.gov/downloads/2017_ 
FDIC_Unbanked_HH_Survey_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ5M-DRZ3] (finding that 6.5 percent 
of households were unbanked and 18.7 percent of households were underbanked in 2017). 
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participation in the US financial system by expanding access to the 
money supply or serving as a springboard to quality financial services.9 
According to a survey conducted in 2020 by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), nearly 86 percent of the sixty-five 
central banks that responded are exploring CBDC to some extent.10 
Central banks are examining retail CBDC for various motivations, 
including financial stability, monetary policy implementation, financial 
inclusion, efficiency in domestic and cross-border payments, and the 
safety and robustness of payments.11 Countries all over the world have 
undertaken CBDC exploration projects at different stages of research 
or development.12 Among these projects include the monetary 
authorities of the Bahamas, China, and Sweden. In October 2020, the 
Central Bank of the Bahamas launched the world’s first “live” 
nationwide retail CBDC in the form of its Sand Dollar.13 The People’s 
Bank of China issued the first pilots of its digital yuan, formerly known 
as Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP), in April 2020.14 The 
first DCEP pilots processed over three million transactions, totaling 
more than RMB 1.1 billion ($162 million USD).15 The Sveriges 
Riksbank initiated its e-krona project in response to the declining use 
of cash and is performing pilot tests of payment, deposit, and transfer 
capabilities for the e-krona.16 
 
 9. See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 125–30; ACCENTURE & DIGIT. DOLLAR FOUND.,  
THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT: EXPLORING A US CBDC 13 (2020) [hereinafter THE  
DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT], https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e16627eb901b656f2c174ca/t/ 
5f0c5d052d6235002637d0f6/1594645769165/Digital-Dollar-Project-Whitepaper_vF_7_13_20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4TEK-39S6]. 
 10. BIS SURVEY, supra note 6, at 6. 
 11. Id. at 6–8. 
 12. Id. at 6.   
 13. Id. at 3; see also Sebastian Sinclair, Central Bank of Bahamas Launches Landmark 
‘Sand Dollar’ Digital Currency, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/central-bank-of-bahamas-
launches-landmark-sand-dollar-digital-currency [https://perma.cc/94AG-DFGV] (last updated 
Oct. 21, 2020, 9:50 AM).   
 14. Ada Hui, China Central Bank Official Reveals Results of First Digital Yuan Pilots, 
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/china-central-bank-official-reveals-results-of-first-digital-
yuan-pilots [https://perma.cc/8N83-37U3] (last updated Oct. 9, 2020, 11:32 AM). 
 15. Id. (“The digital wallets processed . . . digital yuan transactions between April and 
August when the pilots launched and ended . . . making it the most widely used central bank  
digital currency (CBDC) in a commercial setting.”).   
 16. Rafaela Lindeberg & Ott Ummelas, Sweden Explores Moving to a Digital Currency, 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-11/sweden-explores-the-feasibil-
ity-of-moving-to-a-digital-currency [https://perma.cc/ZDF3-AR45] (last updated Dec. 30, 2020, 9:04 
AM).   
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Relative to other countries, the United States has been slow to 
embrace the concept of digital currency.17 As of this writing, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System18 has not announced any 
plans to launch a CBDC in the near future, but it has shifted its position 
on CBDC from one of skepticism to one of insistence in remaining “on 
the frontier of research and policy development regarding CBDCs.”19 
Federal Reserve Banks are now actively researching CBDC and 
relevant technologies.20 The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston is 
collaborating with the Digital Currency Initiative at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology on a multiyear project exploring the use of 
technologies to test a hypothetical CBDC,21 and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York established an innovation center via an initiative 
with the Bank for International Settlements to explore relevant trends 
and fintech developments.22 
The decision to issue a retail CBDC is driven by both domestic 
circumstances23 and seeming pressure for central banks to stay at the 
forefront of innovation.24 The issuance of a US retail CBDC is almost 
inevitable given the rapid digitalization of the global economy and the 
ever importance of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency.25 The 
issuance of other sovereign digital currencies presents the opportunity 
 
 17. Billy Bambrough, The U.S. ‘Falling Behind’ on Digital Dollar, FORBES (July 22, 2020, 
4:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/07/22/the-us-is-falling-behind-on-
digital-dollar/?sh=61b7082420e9 [https://perma.cc/9U7U-PJGQ]. 
 18. The Federal Reserve System is the US Central Bank and is composed of three key 
entities: the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, twelve Federal Reserve Banks, and the Federal 
Open Market Committee. Structure of the Federal Reserve System, FED. RSRV., https://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-system.htm [https://perma.cc/SVS2-9X23] 
(last updated Mar. 3, 2017). The use of “Federal Reserve” in this Note refers to the Federal Reserve 
System. See id. 
 19. See Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., An Update on 
Digital Currencies, Speech at the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of San  
Francisco’s Innovation Office Hours (Aug. 13, 2020), in FED. RSRV., https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200813a.htm [https://perma.cc/4A7B-SS4T]. 
 20. See id.   
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. BANK OF CANADA, EUR. CENT. BANK, BANK OF JAPAN, SVERIGES RIKSBANK, SWISS 
NAT’L BANK, BANK OF ENG., BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. & BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES: FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND CORE FEATURES 2 (2020) 
[hereinafter BIS CBDC REPORT], https://www.bis.org/publ/othp33.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD7T-
QT9V]. 
 24. Jason Brett, Why Chris Giancarlo Considers a Digital Dollar Mission Critical for the 
World, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/04/26/why-
chris-giancarlo-considers-a-digital-dollar-mission-critical-for-the-world/?sh=2b6c131d3c41 
[https://perma.cc/WJZ3-898Z]. 
 25. See id.; THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 31–32. 
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for sovereign states to bypass the global banking system or compete 
with the US dollar for global prominence.26 The Federal Reserve is 
seemingly on the path to eventually issuing a retail CBDC in the 
future.27 Furthermore, the Biden-Harris administration—particularly 
given the appointment of federal agency heads who are proponents of 
digital currency28—may accelerate the issuance of a retail CBDC in an 
effort to reassert US global governance.29 The maintenance of the US 
dollar’s prominence as a currency in the global economy also comes with 
additional responsibility in designing and implementing a US retail 
CBDC because a US digital currency would likely set the stage for  
the global community.30 Therefore, the digital transformation of the 
world demands a resilient US digital payments infrastructure that 
provides immediacy and integration between payments and digital 
services—both domestically and internationally—and also ensures 
cybersecurity, privacy, and reliability.31 
CBDC offers many benefits but also presents unique risks. 
CBDC would strengthen the traceability of money and offer financial 
regulators greater control, transparency, and oversight.32 A CBDC 
 
 26. See THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 32; see also Brett, supra note 24. 
 27. See Brainard, supra note 19.   
 28. See Michael J. Casey, Money Reimagined: Letter to President Biden, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/money-reimagined-letter-to-president-biden [https://perma.cc/FH5L-
FYR7] (last updated Jan. 22, 2021, 4:46 PM) (reporting on “Biden’s crypto gang”). 
 29. See George Ingram, Renewing US Global Engagement in a Changed World, 
BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/01/12/renewing-us-
global-engagement-in-a-changed-world/ [https://perma.cc/67XD-8ZTZ]. 
 30. See Sharon Bowen, Former Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,  
Remarks at Digital Dollar Live, at 24:31 (July 21, 2020), in ACCENTURE https://www.accen-
ture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-130/Accenture-Digital-Dollar-Live-Video-Transcript.pdf#zoom=50 
[https://perma.cc/U8DD-GNNT]; Sheila Warren, Head of Blockchain & Data Pol’y, Member of the 
Exec. Comm., World Econ. F., Remarks at Digital Dollar Live, at 29:02 (July 21, 2020),  
in ACCENTURE https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-130/Accenture-Digital-Dollar-Live-
Video-Transcript.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/U8DD-GNNT]; see also Tim Alper, Fed Chief Bets 
That US’s ‘First-Mover Advantage’ in CBDC Race Is Stronger than China’s, CRYPTONEWS (Jan. 15, 
2021), https://cryptonews.com/news/fed-chief-bets-that-us-s-first-mover-advantage-in-cbdc-race-
8913.htm [https://perma.cc/8RJ9-YU9C]. 
 31. See generally Fabio Panetta, Member, Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech at the 
Deutsche Bundesbank Conference on the “Future of Payments in Europe” (Nov. 27, 2020), in 
EUROOPAN KESKUSPANKKI, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201127~ 
a781c4e0fc.fi.html [https://perma.cc/9MM9-EQ5K] (explaining how digital transformation has  
impacted consumer demands).   
 32. See Sarah Allen, Srdjan Capkun, Ittay Eyal, Giulia Fanti, Bryan Ford, James  
Grimmelmann, Ari Juels, Kari Kostiainen, Sarah Meiklejohn, Andrew Miller, Eswar Prasad, Karl 
Wüst & Fan Zhang, Design Choice for Central Bank Digital Currency: Policy and Technical  
Considerations 11–13 (Glob. Econ. & Dev. at Brookings, Working Paper No. 140, 2020) [hereinafter 
Brookings Paper], https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Design-Choices-for-
CBDC_Final-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7SE-3QJB]. 
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could provide the Federal Reserve a real-time, panoramic view of the 
financial system and bolster data sharing between government entities 
for regulatory interests, such as preventing money laundering.33 
Conversely, the enhanced visibility provided by a CBDC also poses a 
concern for individual privacy. What data will be collected by a CBDC? 
Who will have access to CBDC data? How will CBDC data be used? 
Moreover, a CBDC could be programmable—such that government 
officials can embed code in a retail CBDC that will enable them to see 
transactional history or other insights regardless of who directly 
operates the system.34 Consequently, government officials could utilize 
a retail CBDC as a policy tool for economic benefit while also 
undertaking measures that may encroach on individual privacy if there 
is no clear boundary in place that limits use of retail CBDC data. The 
wide adoption of a retail CBDC necessitates serious consideration of 
privacy concerns to foster public trust in the system.35 Although CBDC 
could leverage privacy-enhancing technologies to promote trust in the 
system, legal choices can further enhance trust in a CBDC amid 
regulatory obligations by providing parameters in the collection, access, 
and use of retail CBDC data. 
This Note examines the inherent tension between privacy and 
transparency of user identity and transactions within a retail CBDC 
operated by the Federal Reserve. A retail CBDC would generally grant 
the Federal Reserve unprecedented access to personal information  
and financial data, and thereby implicate material privacy concerns. 
This Note suggests that the Privacy Act of 1974 be applied to CBDC 
records and refined in several ways to protect individual privacy or 
alternatively, a new regulatory framework informed by the Privacy Act 
be adopted to directly respond to the rising privacy demands of a retail 
CBDC. Part I discusses general technical aspects of a retail CBDC, 
provisions of the Privacy Act, key financial privacy laws, and current 
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism 
 
 33. See id. at 63–64. See generally Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Glob. Head of Fin. Crime 
Threat Mitigation & Grp. Gen. Manager, HSBC, Remarks at the Central Bank of the Future  
Conference: Panel No. 4—Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Inclusion (Oct. 2, 2019), in UNIV. 
OF MICH. CTR. ON FIN. L. & POL’Y, http://financelawpolicy.umich.edu/central-bank-of-the-future-
conference [https://perma.cc/7X8H-WH7M] (providing ways AML practices can be improved,  
including “understanding from a high definition view of what is the probability that someone poses 
a high financial crime risk. Zoom in and understand where there is risk and pinpoint it and take 
appropriate actions.”). 
 34. See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 64–66; see also BANK OF ENG., CENTRAL  
BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND DESIGN 45–46 (2020), 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2020/central-bank-digital-currency-op-
portunities-challenges-and-design.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6FX-B3FP]. 
 35. Bowen, supra note 30, at 33:30.   
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(AML/CFT) jurisprudence and regulatory practices. Part II examines 
the efficacy of the Privacy Act’s protections and identifies shortcomings 
of the Act in consideration of potential use cases of retail CBDC records, 
vulnerabilities for non-US citizens and non-US permanent residents, 
and government information-sharing practices under the Act’s routine 
use exception. Part III suggests that retail CBDC  records would likely 
constitute a “system of records” under the Privacy Act but necessitate 
stronger privacy protections that go beyond the mere possession of 
information in order to prevent use cases of big data that would 
undermine individual privacy in a retail CBDC and consequently 
thwart freedom of expression and freedom of association. It proposes 
either (1) amending the Privacy Act to balance the government’s 
vantage point in a retail CBDC or (2) creating a new privacy framework 
informed by the Privacy Act that responds to the privacy demands of a 
retail CBDC under the control of the Federal Reserve. It recommends 
amending the Privacy Act to (a) expressly protect individuals who are 
noncitizens or nonpermanent residents of the United States, (b) 
prescribe permissible uses of retail CBDC records and implement a 
tiered access approach to the disclosure of CBDC records, (c)  limit the 
routine use exception to protection under the Act in the context of a 
retail CBDC to prevent backdoor access to invasive government 
surveillance and unwarranted disclosure of individual records, (d) 
bolster procedural requirements for access to retail CBDC records, and 
(e) impose more stringent liability provisions for the misuse of retail 
CBDC records. This approach would strike a proper balance between 
privacy and transparency by preserving some expectation of individual 
privacy from needless government surveillance while permitting 
regulatory innovation and legitimate law enforcement actions. 
I. INNOVATION AND PRIVACY IN DIGITAL PAYMENTS 
A. What Is Central Bank Digital Currency? 
Central bank digital currency is a digital form of fiat currency 
created and issued by a central bank.36 Fiat money, such as the US 
dollar, is a currency that lacks intrinsic value and is declared a legal 
tender by government decree. Currently, the Federal Reserve issues 
two forms of fiat money—physical cash (banknotes)37 and reserves (or 
 
 36. See BIS SURVEY, supra note 6, at 4. 
 37. See FED. RSRV. SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS  
134–35 (10th ed. 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_complete.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4QX-9MHA]. Coins are not liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks. Id. The 
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“wholesale” CBDC).38 Physical cash is a liability of the Federal Reserve 
and distributed to the general public through depository institutions.39 
The general public can hold demand deposits at depository institutions 
(bank accounts) from which physical cash can be obtained.40 Unlike 
physical cash, deposits are direct liabilities of the issuing 
intermediary.41 Conversely, reserves held at the Federal Reserve are 
exclusive to qualified financial institutions and government entities.42 
A retail CBDC would be a third form of fiat money that is a liability of 
the central bank, complements physical cash, and can be made 
available to the general public through digital wallets or deposits held 
at the central bank or a financial intermediary depending on the policy 
choices of a CBDC.43 
A retail CBDC is an opportunity to transform the dollar and US 
payments system. Innovative digital payment platforms, such as 
Venmo, have reshaped consumer expectations and normalized cashless 
transactions. Venmo is a peer-to-peer mobile payments application that 
offers users the ability to link their bank accounts, debit cards, or credit 
cards to a Venmo account (or digital wallet) from which users can 
transfer funds to other Venmo accounts.44 Unlike Venmo, where a user 
must transfer funds from a financial intermediary to conduct 
transactions on the application, a CBDC could represent these funds. A 
CBDC would remove a step in the payment process by eliminating the 
transfer (information exchange) between financial intermediaries. The 
Federal Reserve could promote the realization of CBDC’s slated 
opportunities by serving as a provider of a secure and resilient 
payments infrastructure that is widely accessible to the general 
public.45 
Retail CBDC proposals have included various concepts with 
different design choices.46 Retail CBDC can take the form of two 
 
United States Mint issues coins and sells them to the Federal Reserve Banks, which in turn, sell 
them to depository institutions. Id. 
 38. See Laura Hopper, Does the Federal Reserve Print Money?, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS 
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2017/november/does-federal-reserve-print-
money [https://perma.cc/X34A-NCW6]; BIS CBDC REPORT, supra note 23, at 4. 
 39. “Federal Reserve notes in circulation are liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks and 
are collateralized by the assets of the Reserve Banks.” FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 37, at 134. 
 40.  See THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 26. 
 41. FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 37, at 134. 
 42. See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 115–16. 
 43. See BIS SURVEY, supra note 6, at 4. 
 44. What Is Venmo?, VENMO, https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/221011388-What-
is-Venmo- [https://perma.cc/7F9U-VKH2] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021). 
 45. See BIS CBDC REPORT, supra note 23, at 1. 
 46. Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 10–11. 
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technical designs: “accounts” or “tokens.”47 An account is a 
representation of money in the form of electronic ledger entries.48  
An account-based CBDC would be a demand deposit account49 
denominated in CBDC and use a centralized ledger system.50 The 
centralized ledger system would rely on a central authority (i.e., the 
Federal Reserve or a financial intermediary) to authorize CBDC 
transactions and control a ledger that records CBDC account 
balances.51 For example, FedAccounts is an account-based CBDC 
proposal that offers the general public (US citizens, residents, and 
domestically domiciled businesses and institutions) the option to hold 
accounts at the Federal Reserve.52 FedAccounts would differ from 
standard bank accounts in that they are fully sovereign base money  
and possess no fees or minimum balances, interest on balances, instant  
in-network payments, and no interchange fees.53 For the purposes of 
this Note, an account-based CBDC possesses the aforementioned 
qualities of a FedAccount; and conversely, is available to all persons in 
the United States that satisfy Know Your Customer standards. 
In contrast, a token is a bearer instrument.54 A token-based 
CBDC could operate using distributed ledger technology (DLT).55 
Blockchain technology is mentioned in several CBDC proposals and is 
popularly known for facilitating Bitcoin transactions.56 For example, 
the Digital Dollar Project is a token-based CBDC proposal that offers a 
tokenized dollar accessible to all persons in the United States. The 
proposed example would be fully fungible with Federal Reserve notes 
and reserves, potentially use a DLT-informed infrastructure, utilize the 
existing two-tiered banking system, and possess the potential for 
additional programmable capabilities.57 For the purposes of this Note’s 
 
 47. See id.; see also WORLD ECON. F., CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY POLICY-MAKER 
TOOLKIT 9 (2020) [hereinafter WEF TOOLKIT], http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_CBDC_ 
Policymaker_Toolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/875R-5RBM]. 
 48. See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 124; KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE 
NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 30 (2018). 
 49. Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 10–11. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 19–22. 
 52. FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 116, 122. 
 53. Id. at 122–23. 
 54. See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 9 (explaining that cash is a bearer instrument, as it 
is valuable in itself). 
 55. Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 11. 
 56. See WEF TOOLKIT, supra note 47, at 10–11. See generally THE DIGITAL DOLLAR 
PROJECT, supra note 9, at 11, 18 (explaining the tokenization of the dollar and distributed ledger 
technology). 
 57. See THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 7–12, 18. 
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analysis, a token-based CBDC possesses the aforementioned qualities 
of the Digital Dollar Project proposal, but conversely, it uses a 
decentralized network under the control of the Federal Reserve 
notwithstanding how the CBDC is distributed to the general public. 
Like token-based CBDC, account-based CBDC could also use a 
permissioned blockchain. A retail CBDC could also use different types 
of DLT or non-DLT solutions.58  
Due to current regulatory objectives, such as anti-money 
laundering compliance, it is unlikely a retail CBDC would be 
untraceable and enable complete anonymity like cash. The 
Congressional Research Service has conceded that a CBDC that allows 
absolute anonymity would be inconsistent with the current anti-money 
laundering regime.59 Therefore, a retail CBDC—whether account-based 
or token-based—would not enable complete cash-like transactions 
because a CBDC would undoubtedly use a compliant ledger-based 
system.60 
1. The Process of Payments 
The key distinction between accounts and tokens is the payment 
verification process.61 An account-based CBDC payments system would 
verify the identity of the account holder to circumvent identity theft.62 
In comparison, a token-based CBDC payments system would 
authenticate the validity of a token to avoid potential “electronic 
counterfeiting.”63 Additionally, the process of payments depends on the 
type of ledger technology (centralized versus distributed) of a CBDC. 
Currently, retail payments between account holders at different 
banks use an automated clearing house (ACH) for the clearing and 
settlement of payments.64 An ACH is a centralized system that clears 
and settles transfers between depository institutions.65 “Clearing” is the 
 
 58. See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 12–24. 
 59. MARC LABONTE, REBECCA M. NELSON & DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
IF11471, FINANCIAL INNOVATION: CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 2 (2020). 
 60. See BANK OF ENG., supra note 34, at 47 (“[A]ny CBDC would need to be compatible 
with AML obligations, ruling out truly anonymous payments.”). 
 61. See COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & MKTS. COMM., BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (2018) [hereinafter COMM. ON PAYMENTS], 
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf [https://perma.cc/R453-XYXZ]. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. FedNow Service: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. RSRV., https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_faq.htm [https://perma.cc/MN3F-7SM4] (last updated Aug. 6, 
2020). 
 65. Id. 
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process of receiving and reconciling information about a payment and 
can include additional activities such as a fraud screening.66 
“Settlement” is the process of debiting and crediting account balances 
to transfer funds.67 An ACH essentially connects the separate ledgers 
of different payment providers.68 This results in delayed transfers and 
other significant inefficiencies.69 Additionally, the Federal Reserve has 
a centralized payments infrastructure (real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS))70 that processes interbank transfers (not retail payments) in 
real time.71 Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Federal Reserve to rely 
on DLT for an account-based CBDC.72 An account-based CBDC could 
use the Federal Reserve’s RTGS system and offer instantaneous 
payments.73 
Alternatively, a retail CBDC could use a distributed ledger 
system to facilitate transactions.74 DLT enables a “shared state” 
between network participants without a central authority.75 A series  
of smart contracts could be the mechanism to reconcile and complete 
the transfer of digital currency between users.76 Smart contracts  
are computer code (or software programs) that execute instructions  
on a blockchain.77 A smart contract verifies the legitimacy of the 
transaction.78 If conditions of the transfer are met, the transaction will 
be recorded in the ledger and completed.79 For example, user A initiates 
a promise that she will send a certain amount of bitcoin to user B. The 
transfer of bitcoin constitutes a contractual agreement (a specification 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 130–32. 
 70. See id.; Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Delivering 
Fast Payments for All, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Town Hall (Aug. 5, 
2019), in FED. RSRV., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20190805a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EZS5-ZD9D]. 
 71. See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 130–32; see also COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note 
61, at 7. 
 72. Helen Partz, European Central Bank Execs Explain Why CBDCs Don’t Need  
Blockchain, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 21, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/european-central-
bank-execs-explain-why-cbdcs-don-t-need-blockchain [https://perma.cc/35CF-VGVP]. 
 73. See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 130–32. 
 74. See WEF TOOLKIT, supra note 47, at 10–11. 
 75. See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 64. 
 76. See id. at 63–64. 
 77. Id. 
 78.  See Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/85HP-WGTP] (last  
updated June 7, 2016, 4:48 PM). 
 79. WERBACH, supra note 48, at 63–64. 
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of rights and obligations).80 A smart contract ensures that user A does 
not renege on her promise to transfer bitcoin to user B by synchronizing 
the rights and obligations of the transfer (i.e., the amount of bitcoin) to 
execute the contractual agreement between user A and user B.81 
2. Smart Money and Digital Privacy 
A retail CBDC could leverage DLT (or numerous, trusted 
variations) to become “smart” money.82 Smart money would be 
programmable and allow the Federal Reserve (or other government 
entities) precise control over a retail CBDC.83 A retail CBDC could be 
non-fungible (unlike physical cash) to the extent that different 
capabilities are programmed into the CBDC.84 Additionally, a retail 
CBDC would likely use a permissioned decentralized network. A 
permissioned decentralized network would enable the Federal Reserve 
to control who has access to the retail CBDC network, regulate the 
activity of CBDC users, and specify the terms under which the system 
grants shared access to transaction information for certain CBDC 
network participants.85 For instance, the Federal Reserve could permit 
other governmental entities access to CBDC transaction data, or it 
could utilize smart contracts in a retail CBDC to receive certain insights 
that inform regulatory oversight.86 On the other hand, the precise 
control over CBDC could also aid in the inappropriate surveillance 
discussed in Part III. The programmability of a retail CBDC offers 
endless possibilities but poses major risks for privacy in the absence of 
a proper privacy framework. 
This Note focuses on a US retail CBDC that uses either a 
centralized ledger system or a permissioned decentralized system 
under the control of the Federal Reserve—particularly to the extent 
that the Federal Reserve is the central authority of CBDC records. This 
includes a CBDC system that requires the Federal Reserve to engage 
in recordkeeping, such as CBDC accounts directly held at the Federal 
Reserve; CBDC accounts held as “pass-through”87 accounts at a 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 47–48, 64–68; see also BANK OF ENG., supra 
note 34, at 41–42, 45–46. 
 83. See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 64–65; see also BANK OF ENG., supra note 34, 
at 45–46. 
 84. See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 64–65. 
 85. See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 60. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Banking for All Act, S. 3571, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020) (as introduced by Sen. Sherrod 
Brown) (defining pass-through accounts). 
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financial intermediary; a CBDC token that is implemented on a ledger 
directly accessible by the Federal Reserve; and more broadly, a CBDC 
token that is programmable (i.e., embedded supervision via smart 
contracts)88 by the Federal Reserve. It will exclusively address the 
inherent tension between individual privacy and financial integrity 
standards within a retail CBDC. Although a third party could manage 
regulatory due diligence for a retail CBDC system under the control of 
the Federal Reserve, such an arrangement would not preclude the 
Federal Reserve’s direct access to financial records in its ledger or 
through generated insights. This Note will not discuss technical 
granularities of a retail CBDC, privacy-enhancing technologies, or 
cybersecurity. 
B. The “Expectation” of Financial Privacy 
Retail CBDC will inevitably generate a digital financial 
footprint given the incidence of transaction records. What this digital 
financial footprint reveals about individuals could implicate material 
privacy concerns. The scale of recordkeeping in a retail CBDC could 
amass a wide range of personal information and financial data into a 
system of records. Theoretically, this could result in government access 
to personal information that invades individual privacy. Thus, the 
successful implementation and wide adoption of retail CBDC requires 
a revised privacy framework to account for technological advancements.   
1. Fair Information Practices: Privacy Act of 1974 
Presently, the Federal Reserve is subject to the Privacy Act of 
1974.89 Congress enacted the Privacy Act to curb unwarranted 
invasions of individual privacy by federal agencies.90 The Act was 
drafted in response to the increased use of information systems within 
government operations.91 Innovations in computerized databases 
enabled federal agencies to easily cross-reference an individual’s 
personal information and potentially compile various personal details 
 
 88. See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 47–48, 64–68; see also BANK OF ENG., supra 
note 34, at 41–42, 45–46. 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 12 C.F.R. § 261a (2020). 
 90. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) (“The purpose of this Act [enacting this section and provisions set out 
as notes under this section] is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion 
of personal privacy”). 
 91. See id. 
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about an individual in a database.92 The Privacy Act governs the 
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally 
identifiable information93 contained in a system of records by federal 
agencies.94 The Act allows US citizens and permanent residents to bring 
civil actions against the federal government for violations of the statute 
and provides for civil damages.95 Note, the Act only protects US citizens 
and permanent residents, and therefore, undocumented immigrants 
and nonimmigrants (F-1 visa students, B1/B2 business visitors or 
tourists, K-1 visa fiancées, and individuals with temporary protected 
status) have no recourse under the Act for invasive government 
information practices.96 The Act also imposes criminal penalties (a 
misdemeanor and a fine not more than $5,000) on (1) agency officers or 
employees who knowingly and willfully disclose information to an 
unauthorized person or agency, (2) agency officers or employees who 
willfully maintain a system of records in violation of notice 
requirements, and (3) any person who knowingly and willfully requests 
or obtains any record about an individual from an agency under false 
pretenses.97 
A federal agency is permitted to maintain in its records only 
personal information that is relevant and necessary to accomplish the 
purposes of the agency, a statute, or an executive order.98 Subsection 
(a)(3) of the Act defines “maintain” as synonymous with “maintain, 
collect, use, or disseminate.”99 “Record” refers to any type of information 
maintained on an individual, such as financial transactions.100 Notably, 
 
 92. See The Privacy Act of 1974, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5GEQ-9DGJ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [hereinafter EPIC] (explaining the history of the Privacy 
Act of 1974). 
 93. See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Acting Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, M-06-15, Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information 
(May 22, 2006), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2006/m-
06-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/952G-KGAS] (“[Personally identifiable information] can be used to  
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or 
identifying information that is linked or associated with a specific individual.”). 
 94. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a; see also Privacy Act of 1974, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.: OFF. OF  
PRIV. & CIV. LIBERTIES, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 [https://perma.cc/QDH9-
ZQQY] (last updated Jan. 15, 2020). 
 95. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g); see EPIC, supra note 92. 
 96. See EPIC, supra note 92. 
 97. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i). 
 98. Id. § 552a(e). 
 99. Id. § 552a(a)(3). 
 100. Id. § 552a(a)(4) (“[T]he term ‘record’ means any item, collection, or grouping of  
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his 
education, financial transactions . . . or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying  
particular assigned to the individual”). 
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a “system of records” is a database “under the control of any agency” 
from which information is retrieved by a personal identifier, such as a 
name.101  Hence, retail CBDC records under the control of the Federal 
Reserve would likely constitute a “system of records” maintained by the 
Federal Reserve pursuant to the Privacy Act and therefore be subject 
to protection.   
Federal agencies possessing personally identifiable information 
must provide safeguards for confidentiality and follow procedural 
requirements to permit access to the information.102 In the absence of 
an enumerated exception under the Act, federal agencies are prohibited 
from disclosing any record contained in a system of records to third 
parties or other agencies without the written request or prior written 
consent of the individual to whom the record concerns.103 One of these 
exceptions is for a “routine use.”104 Federal agencies must publish a 
notice in the Federal Register when establishing a new system of 
records and describe, among other things, the nature of the records 
maintained in the system and each routine use of the records (including 
“categories of users and purpose of such use”).105 Law enforcement 
agencies (e.g., the CIA, FBI) can also exempt themselves from many of 
the Act’s requirements.106 
Despite notice and consent requirements, the “routine use” 
exception has been criticized for allowing a great amount of 
disclosures.107 Routine use is the disclosure of a record for a purpose 
that is “compatible” with the purpose for which the information was 
collected.108 The meaning of “compatible” is vague but can encompass 
“functionally equivalent uses and other uses that are necessary and 
proper.”109 Hence, agencies can establish a broad routine use that 
includes every potential use of data as long as the routine use is 
compatible with, rather than identical to, the purpose for which the 
information is collected.110 This has been criticized as enabling “mission 
creeps” for a system of records by allowing agencies’ expansions of 
 
 101. See id. § 552a. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. § 552a(b). 
 104. See id. § 552a(b)(3). 
 105. Id. § 552a(e)(4). 
 106. See id. § 552a(j)–(k). 
 107. See EPIC, supra note 92.   
 108. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7). 
 109. Guidance on the Privacy Act Implications of Call Detail Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 
12,990, 12,993 (Apr. 20, 1987). 
 110. See EPIC, supra note 92. 
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routine uses that go beyond intended purposes over time.111 
Additionally, agencies may disclose records indicating a potential 
violation of law under the routine use exception to law enforcement 
agencies for the purposes of investigation or prosecution (despite the 
purpose for which the records were collected).112 
2. Strictly Confidential Tax Records 
The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) information-sharing policy 
with the Social Security Administration (SSA) is a notable example of 
a policy choice that advances the IRS’s objectives by limiting 
government information-sharing practices. The IRS provides individual 
taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs) to individuals who do not have 
or are ineligible for a social security number.113 Thus, undocumented 
immigrants can file taxes with the IRS with an ITIN despite 
unconventional circumstances of their employment.114 The IRS is 
permitted to share certain information about individual earnings to the 
SSA for the purpose of determining each worker’s entitlement to social 
security benefits.115 However, the SSA is prohibited from sharing that 
information with others, including the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), despite its law enforcement purpose.116 IRS officials 
have previously expressed that sharing tax information with DHS 
would decrease tax collection and compliance; and moreover, such a 
practice would generally discourage individuals from complying with 
tax laws.117 Although sharing information with DHS would aid its 
enforcement efforts, this interest does not warrant denying privacy 
protections for many individuals.118 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3); see also OFF. OF PRIV. & CIV. LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., 
OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (2020). 
 113. Beverly Bird, Filing Taxes as an Undocumented Worker, BALANCE, https://www.the-
balance.com/undocumented-immigrant-taxes-rules-and-requirements-4778580 [https://perma.cc/ 
GF74-2UDD] (last updated Jan. 16, 2021).   
 114. See id.   
 115. Jennifer Chang Newell, Will Immigration Authorities Use Our Taxes to Go After  
Immigrants?, ACLU (Apr. 23, 2018, 5:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/depor-
tation-and-due-process/will-immigration-authorities-use-our-taxes-go [https://perma.cc/DA33-
SFX7]. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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3. Financial Integrity 
Unraveling the inherent tension between privacy and 
transparency in a CBDC requires determining the permissible level of 
anonymity within financial transactions. Generally, physical cash 
provides the highest degree of privacy because it allows peer-to-peer 
transactions between parties without the facilitation of an intermediary 
or any recordkeeping of transactions in a ledger. The untraceable 
nature of cash enables a significant level of anonymity, which can also 
aid illicit and illegal activities, such as money laundering, tax evasion, 
and the financing of terrorism.119 Conversely, cash held in a bank 
account creates a digital footprint (i.e., account holdings and  
financial transaction data) that is visible to the bank and potentially 
accessible by the government. A retail CBDC would similarly enable 
recordkeeping of financial transactions while also allowing the federal 
government unprecedented access to individual financial information 
through the elimination of a third-party intermediary. 
The Federal Reserve will undoubtedly adhere to existing 
financial laws and regulations to ensure the integrity of a CBDC. All 
financial institutions operating within the United States are subject to 
the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA).120 The BSA requires financial 
institutions to assist in preventing and detecting money laundering, 
countering the financing of terrorism, and detecting suspicious 
activities.121 Banks are required to file currency transaction reports for 
cash transactions over $10,000 in one business day122 and file suspicious 
activity reports for questionable activities.123 In 2001, following the 9/11 
attacks, the BSA was amended by the PATRIOT Act.124 Title III of the 
PATRIOT Act requires US banks to develop a Customer Identification 
Program to curb the financing of terrorist organizations.125 Banks must 
verify a customer’s identity, suitability, and risks before opening new 
 
 119. See Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Itai Agur, Anil Ari, 
John Kiff, Adina Popescu & Celine Rochon, Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency, IMF 
Staff Discussion Note, at 20, SDN/18/08 (Nov. 12, 2018); see also Money Laundering, FATF, 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ [https://perma.cc/D6QC-GJKP?type=image] (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2021). 
 120. Bank Secrecy Act, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/index-bsa.html 
[https://perma.cc/NMP4-53VD] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021). 
 121. See Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311, amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272, 296 (2001). 
 122. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2021). 
 123. Id. § 1010.320 
 124. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272, 296 (2001). 
 125. See id.   
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bank accounts and maintain Customer Identification Program records 
for five years after an account is closed.126 These customer due diligence 
rules are also known as Know Your Customer laws; they are intended 
to protect banks from being used for criminal activity by allowing banks 
to collect and analyze personally identifiable information to screen and 
create customer profiles.127 Therefore, bank records are “private” in the 
sense that they are not readily available to others. However, the degree 
of privacy in bank records is limited under the current rule of law. 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—a 
bureau of the US Department of the Treasury—is charged with 
implementing, administering, and enforcing compliance with the 
BSA.128 FinCEN’s duties and powers include serving as the Financial 
Intelligence Unit of the United States, maintaining an accessible 
database of financial transaction information, determining trends and 
methods in financial crimes, and analyzing and sharing information to 
support law enforcement investigations at the federal, state, local,  
and international levels.129 The agency has numerous data-access 
Memoranda of Understanding with federal, state, and local  
law enforcement and regulatory agencies. The Memoranda of 
Understanding grant direct access to FinCEN’s BSA data through the 
FinCEN portal. The FinCEN portal houses the FinCEN Query search 
engine—a tool similar to Google, which enables users to access and 
easily analyze up to eleven years of FinCEN data.130 Users can apply 
filters and narrow search results, access enhanced data, and import 
lists of data (i.e., names, ID numbers, and addresses) to be used as 
criteria.131 FinCEN’s Query search application is part of an ongoing 
effort to modernize the implementation of the BSA.132 
 
 126. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220. 
 127. Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 120. 
 128. 31 U.S.C. § 310. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Support of Law Enforcement, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforce-
ment/support-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/9VA7-YKJK] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021); Press 
Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN Query Now Available for Authorized Users: IT  
Modernization Program Is on Schedule and Within Cost (Sept. 10, 2012), https://www.fin-
cen.gov/sites/default/files/news_release/20120910.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LTF-LSSZ]; FIN. CRIMES 
ENF’T NETWORK, FACT SHEET: THE FINCEN PORTAL (2021), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/shared/Facts_FinCENPortal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KQ3-SWJ9]. 
 131. See THE FINCEN PORTAL, supra note 130. 
 132. See FinCEN’s IT Modernization Efforts, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/fincens-it-
modernization-efforts [https://perma.cc/7S5K-7ZJQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021). 
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4. Is There a Right to Financial Privacy? 
In United States v. Miller, the Court held that there is no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records under the Fourth 
Amendment.133 The Court concluded that bank records are not 
confidential information but rather “negotiable instruments” that 
contain information voluntarily provided to banks.134 Additionally, the 
Court acknowledged that Congress, in enacting the BSA, assumed the 
lack of a legitimate privacy expectation in bank records and intended 
banks to engage in recordkeeping because bank records are useful to 
criminal and regulatory investigations and proceedings.135 Miller 
solidified the third-party doctrine, which provides that an individual 
has no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in information that she 
voluntarily shares with a third party and, therefore, lacks Fourth 
Amendment protection against warrantless search and seizure of this 
information.136 This Note will not further discuss the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to a retail CBDC; however, it is worth highlighting 
that Congress and the Supreme Court have already struck a balance 
between privacy and BSA compliance that permits some intrusion of 
privacy for federal objectives. 
In response to the Miller case, Congress enacted the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA) to protect customer financial 
records from federal government scrutiny.137 The RFPA creates a 
statutory Fourth Amendment protection for bank records by requiring 
federal government authorities seeking customer financial records  
from a financial institution to obtain one of the following: customer 
authorization, administrative subpoena or summons, search warrant, 
judicial subpoena, or a formal written request.138 Additionally, federal 
government officials must provide an individual with written notice of 
the government’s intent to obtain the records, an explanation for  
why the records are being sought, and an opportunity to object to a 
financial institution supplying the records.139 However, there are many 
exceptions to the notice requirement and instances where no notice is 
 
 133. See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
 134. Id. at 442. 
 135. See id. at 442–43 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)). 
 136. See id.   
 137. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id.; see also FED. RSRV., RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT: CONSUMER 
COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1 [hereinafter RFPA HANDBOOK], https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/priv.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG94-FBJ9]. 
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required.140 Notably, the RFPA provides a significant allowance for 
banks acting under the BSA.141 A bank is not required to inform a 
customer when it discloses financial information under certain 
circumstances, such as when it files a suspicious activity report with 
the FinCEN.142 Generally, law enforcement investigations seek 
financial transaction records to uncover hidden assets or suspicious 
behavior that may reveal criminal activity or actors.143 Therefore, there 
is an inevitable clash between privacy and transparency.   
II. ANTIQUATED PRIVACY PROTECTION 
Privacy concerns are generally rooted in the issue of trust, and 
therefore, could be overcome through design choices and appropriate 
legal frameworks that enhance trust in a retail CBDC.144 The  
Federal Reserve’s unique access to individual information and  
financial data from CBDC records could strengthen the anti-money 
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regimes and also 
enable extraordinary government surveillance if left unchecked. 
Hypothetically, government actors could abuse the Federal Reserve’s 
newfound access to individual financial records for inappropriate 
purposes.145 Therefore, privacy choices in a retail CBDC must protect 
users’ information from abuse or needless government surveillance and 
must allow permissible access to financial information for law 
enforcement and regulatory compliance and supervision. Notably, 
privacy protection must keep pace with existing and emerging 
technological advances. 
A. System of Records 
The unique characteristics of databases further exacerbate the 
concern that a retail CBDC system could be misused for unwarranted 
access to personal information. The Privacy Act protects personally 
 
 140. See RFPA HANDBOOK, supra note 139. The exceptions include disclosures not  
identified with particular customers; disclosures pursuant to the functions of supervisory agencies; 
disclosures in accordance with procedures under the Internal Revenue Code; disclosures pursuant 
to any federal statute or rule, administrative subpoena, law enforcement inquiry, and judicial  
proceedings; and disclosures relevant to a violation of the law. Id. 
 141. See id.   
 142. See id. 
 143. See Money Laundering, supra note 119. 
 144. See generally WERBACH, supra note 48, at 19–23 (explaining the general relationship 
between privacy and trust). 
 145. See generally Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 38 (providing potential scenarios that 
pose privacy risks). 
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identifiable information contained in a system of records from which 
data is retrieved by a personal identifier, such as a name and social 
security number.146 It is probable that a retail CBDC database may 
index individual information by a personal identifier given existing 
BSA regulations and practices. The Federal Reserve (or a third-party 
operator) would likely conduct regulatory due diligence for retail  
CBDC accounts (or wallets) in a fashion similar to current procedures 
at financial intermediaries with some potential allowances for any 
financial inclusion goals. Moreover, a retail CBDC system could  
also use pseudonymous identifiers to manage the identity of a  
CBDC holder (or account).147 An individual’s identity would be 
anonymous to the extent that a pseudonym (not an actual identity) is 
shared during transactions.148 Additionally, a retail CBDC could serve 
as a springboard for digital identity use cases.149 Therefore, the 
determination of account identity versus individual identity in a  
retail CBDC would be necessary to appropriately address privacy 
concerns.150   
Under existing BSA regulations, the Federal Reserve (or a  
third-party operator) would be required to engage in recordkeeping of 
retail CBDC transactions and store individual information for an 
extensive period of time in a database.151 Protection under the Privacy 
Act applies only to a database from which data is retrieved by a personal 
identifier152—leaving wide latitude for an agency to choose nonpersonal 
identifiers to circumvent many Privacy Act provisions. For instance, 
retail CBDC users could be indexed in a system by IP address, which 
does not identify a person on its own and must be linked to other 
information to associate it with a specific individual. Therefore, the 
Federal Reserve could bypass requirements under the Privacy Act by 
indexing CBDC users by pseudonymous identifiers and still maintain 
unprecedented amounts of individual data not subject to protective 
measures against invasive government information practices. This 
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 147. See id. at 38–41. 
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 149. See id. at 27–31. 
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 152. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
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shortcoming demonstrates the inefficacy of Privacy Act protections in 
an increasingly digital economy.153 
B. Routine Uses and Information Sharing 
The accessibility of retail CBDC records under the control of the 
Federal Reserve would further exacerbate the shortcomings of the 
personal identifier requirement under the Privacy Act when 
considering existing government information-sharing practices.154 A 
retail CBDC would create a database of financial transaction records 
and other personal information under the control of the government. 
Government agencies have the ability to access multiple public and 
private databases and manipulate data to generate detailed insights 
about individuals.155 Retail CBDC data in combination with data 
analytic tools could augment other government databases through 
existing information-sharing practices among government agencies. 
This would create endless possibilities for the relationship between 
CBDC data and government oversight. The FinCEN has acknowledged 
that its collection of financial data from financial institutions under the 
BSA has aided in anti-money laundering, countering the financing of 
terrorism, and other financial crime investigations because law 
enforcement and intelligence investigators can combine FinCEN data 
with other collected data to draw more accurate identifications of 
respective subjects from information such as banking patterns, 
businesses and personal associations, communication methods, 
previously unknown addresses, and travel patterns.156 With the advent 
of technological innovations, a retail CBDC database under the control 
of the Federal Reserve could bolster existing information-sharing 
practices but needlessly track detailed personal information about 
individuals. Therefore, the concern over privacy in a retail CBDC is not 
only the government’s mere possession and disclosure of individual data 
but also the potential for what the government can do with this data.157 
The Federal Reserve could have unprecedented access to 
individual financial data that the government would traditionally 
access through a third party, such as a commercial bank. Ordinarily, 
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the federal government has access to financial records through lawful 
procedures or voluntary information-sharing protocols with banks 
under the BSA.158 Information-sharing practices could be especially ripe 
for misuse under the routine use exception to certain Privacy Act 
protections if government entities utilize the exception as a backdoor 
opportunity to compile individual financial data from retail CBDC 
records. The routine use exception would allow government agencies to 
extract retail CBDC information from the Federal Reserve’s database 
for uses that could be construed as “compatible” with the purpose for 
which CBDC records are collected. A compatible use under the Act’s 
routine use exception could encompass whatever the Federal Reserve 
deems is “functionally equivalent” or “necessary and proper” for a 
purpose for which retail CBDC data is collected.159 Thus, a retail  
CBDC could be programmed to communicate endless information to 
government entities as long as the purpose for an entity’s access to the 
information could be construed as compatible with the Federal 
Reserve’s purpose for collecting CBDC records. For instance, the 
“collection” of CBDC records could constitute the information that is 
generated by the base programming underpinning the retail CBDC 
infrastructure itself. Additional smart contracts embedded in a CBDC 
for different uses, such as regulatory supervision, could support 
“compatible uses” of information. Therefore, the programmability of a 
retail CBDC could constitute a new, innovative method for information 
sharing. The purpose for collecting CBDC records would essentially 
circumscribe what uses are compatible under the routine use exception. 
Therefore, enumerated purposes for collecting CBDC records would not 
only define use cases but would also be a way to prospectively craft 
information-sharing practices.   
1. Wavering Privacy Protection 
Information-sharing practices in the context of a retail CBDC 
could pose a concern for individuals not currently protected under the 
Privacy Act. The Act does not expressly protect personally identifiable 
information of individuals who are not US citizens or permanent 
residents.160 Traditionally, federal agencies have adopted internal 
policies to extend Privacy Act protections to noncitizens and 
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nonpermanent residents under certain circumstances.161 However, on 
January 25, 2017, then-President Trump issued an executive order that 
discouraged these internal privacy policies and ordered federal agencies 
to exclude individuals who are not US citizens nor lawful permanent 
residents from Privacy Act protections.162 The executive order contained 
immigration enforcement priorities and encouraged more information 
sharing about noncitizens and nonpermanent residents to facilitate 
immigration enforcement.163 The absence of express protection for 
noncitizens and nonpermanent residents leaves a segment of the 
population in a precarious position because noncitizens and 
nonpermanent residents can be subject to invasive government 
information-sharing practices without any legal recourse. The lack of 
protection under the Privacy Act would deter noncitizens and 
nonpermanent residents from participating in a retail CBDC payments 
system and would further marginalize them from the mainstream 
financial system. This could have a domino effect and deter others  
who have relations (social, business, etc.) with noncitizens and 
nonpermanent residents from using a retail CBDC payments system to 
avoid compromising the privacy of noncitizens and nonpermanent 
residents. Therefore, the Privacy Act should be amended to expressly 
protect noncitizens and nonpermanent residents. 
III. PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF RETAIL CBDC 
The privacy policy of a retail CBDC under the control of the 
Federal Reserve should be responsive to technological innovations  
and the sociopolitical reality of privacy. The novelty of a retail CBDC 
creates regulatory uncertainty around the Federal Reserve’s 
appropriate role in safeguarding individual privacy and bolstering 
regulatory innovation. A retail CBDC—whether account-based or 
token-based—would provide the government direct and real-time 
access to personal information and financial data. The scale and success 
of a retail CBDC system relies on trust.164 The public must trust that 
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the government will not misuse CBDC data and the government must 
trust that the CBDC system will not empower bad actors.165 Thus, a 
proper privacy framework for a retail CBDC would help facilitate 
integrity within the system to build trust among the participants and 
operators of the CBDC system.166 Broader protections for privacy may 
be required as the general public’s privacy expectations shift with 
society’s increasing awareness of the impact of data. Amending the 
Privacy Act in the context of a retail CBDC that is under the control of 
the Federal Reserve could harmonize individual privacy and regulatory 
innovation. Alternatively, a new regulatory framework informed by the 
Privacy Act that implements the forgoing refinements to the Privacy 
Act and responds to the arising privacy demands of a retail CBDC could 
better serve privacy concerns, enhance transparency, and promote 
equal access. Furthermore, defining rules that govern the use of CBDC 
data could promote transparency in the payments system.167 
A. Smart Money, Big Data, and Civil Liberties 
Conceptualizing privacy as the mere possession of information 
may no longer be appropriate in the context of a retail CBDC that is 
under the control of the Federal Reserve.168 Technological innovations, 
such as big data, can transform the mere possession of CBDC data into 
a mechanism from which the government extrapolates data-informed 
conclusions for decision-making. Big data maximizes computation 
power and algorithmic accuracy to identify patterns and generate 
insights from large data sets.169 Big data flourishes in large data sets 
because the abundance of data offers more accurate and precise 
intelligence and knowledge.170 Regulating only the possession of CBDC 
records could create absurd results for personal privacy in the age of big 
data. For instance, government officials could use retail CBDC 
transaction records that include references to social movements (e.g., 
donations) and combine this information with data from other agency 
databases, public records, private databases, government intelligence 
systems, social media accounts, or any other available information 
system to potentially uncover political dissidence, identify social 
activists, undermine constitutionally protected activity, or support the 
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undertaking of coercive measures to squash public expression (e.g., 
freeze CBDC accounts or wallets to block financial support for 
protests).171 
The combination of retail CBDC records and big data  
could bolster dataveillance on a mass scale.172 Dataveillance tracks 
metadata—which is essentially data about data.173 Financial records 
can reveal numerous details and insights about an individual’s life, 
such as medical conditions, political affiliations, and location.174 
Currently, private firms use this data to predict consumer behavior  
and future company performance.175 Lenders use financial data to 
predict likelihoods of divorce, travel patterns, and creditworthiness.176 
Direct access to financial records could aid the government in  
curbing tax evasion and monitoring monetary expenditures because  
the federal government could similarly employ predictive analytics  
with retail CBDC records to identify an individual’s behavior and 
movement. This could also detect suspicious activities and be 
advantageous to BSA compliance and enforcement. However, detailed 
analytics could also have far-reaching consequences for individual 
privacy. CBDC records could be repurposed to support government 
surveillance under current privacy laws and could even be unhinged to 
the extent that such surveillance targets vulnerable segments of the 
population.   
The unchecked repurposing of retail CBDC records to augment 
other government data sets could increase the likelihood of racial 
profiling and other arbitrary means of targeting segments of the 
population. The incidence of US government surveillance targeted at 
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social movements, activists, or ethnic minority communities—such as 
the civil rights movement,177 Black Lives Matter organizers or 
supporters,178 and AMEMSA (Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and 
South Asian) communities following 9/11179—demonstrates the need  
to not only safeguard the possession of retail CBDC records but also  
the use of records. The failure to regulate how individual CBDC  
records can be used would ignore potentially harmful effects of big  
data, such as the generation of various insights about individuals or  
the unethical use of data aggregation to segment and target  
individuals for unspecified purposes.180 Prescribing permissible uses of 
retail CBDC records would ensure a retail CBDC system is not 
repurposed to undermine fundamental rights or arbitrarily monitor 
individuals absent suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, a privacy 
framework must keep pace with technological advancements in data 
analytics.   
The relationship between individuals and the government also 
warrants consideration.181 The spirit of the Fourth Amendment 
demonstrates that the government stands in a different position than 
private entities, such as financial institutions.182 A financial institution 
monitoring financial transactions within its system is required by law 
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to do so183 and will not automatically implicate due process concerns.184 
However, the government’s direct access to such information could more 
readily be used against individuals absent procedural safeguards.185 On 
one hand, a retail CBDC is a voluntary option like a private-sector 
financial service; therefore, individuals will have a choice to use private 
financial services in lieu of a retail CBDC payments system. On the 
other hand, a retail CBDC is a public option slated to transform the US 
payments system in hopes of wide adoption for success. Therefore, the 
breadth of power at the government’s disposal—despite an individual’s 
freedom to choose to use a retail CBDC—can be employed to control 
individual behavior and effectively reduce a retail CBDC to an 
authoritative tool that infringes upon civil liberties. A privacy 
framework must (1) prescribe what information the government should 
know and when the government should know this information and  
(2) provide stringent liability provisions for the misuse of retail CBDC 
data to limit the imposition of arbitrary state power. The programmable 
capabilities of a retail CBDC should also be limited to purposes that 
would bolster economic benefits. Technological innovations should be 
used appropriately to ensure the integrity of a retail CBDC system. The 
current BSA regime demands some intrusion into privacy to ensure the 
integrity of the US financial system. Thus, retail CBDC users would 
engage in a “trust tradeoff.”186 CBDC users would enjoy the benefits of 
the payments system (e.g., reliability and efficiency) in exchange for the 
cessation of some privacy to ensure the integrity of a CBDC system.187 
CBDC would be a voluntary, public option that supplements physical 
cash and private-sector payments options. Thus, CBDC users would 
also have to trust that their information would not be misused by 
government actors to willingly engage in the aforementioned tradeoff 
in a retail CBDC system.188 
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B. Permissible Vantage Point 
Retail CBDC records under the control of the Federal Reserve 
would likely classify as a “system of records” under the Privacy Act and 
be subject to safeguards that protect personally identifiable information 
that is accessible from a retail CBDC ledger. A retail CBDC payments 
system raises the concern of mass or targeted government surveillance 
because systems can potentially give rise to a more detailed and 
systematic compilation of personal data about individuals.189 The 
system of records classification would protect individual information 
from inappropriate information-gathering and information-sharing 
practices between government agencies by requiring government 
entities to undergo certain procedures before accessing personal 
information.  
Additionally, information generated from a retail CBDC system 
is collected by default (i.e., location, vendor, transaction amount, item, 
etc.) and not necessarily by consent.190 A retail CBDC reliant on ledger 
technology could use privacy-enhancing technology to limit the type of 
information that is exposed to the Federal Reserve, but this does not 
eliminate the fact that some information must be collected to record 
transactions. Moreover, more information may be required to comply 
with existing BSA recordkeeping standards. 
A proper privacy framework could manage access to the direct 
vantage point that a retail CBDC would provide to government officials. 
Limiting the availability of the routine use exception under the  
Privacy Act for retail CBDC records could help establish a permissible 
vantage point for government actors. Since agencies establish their own 
routine uses and thereby determine the compatibility of such uses,191 it 
is crucial that a privacy framework define permissible uses of retail 
CBDC records to provide parameters around the routine use. The  
RFPA provides relevant guidance on procedural protections that can 
augment current disclosure safeguards under the Privacy Act.192 For 
instance, under the RFPA, government authorities seeking customer 
financial records from a financial institution must obtain one of  
the following: customer authorization; administrative subpoena or 
summons; search warrant; judicial subpoena; or a formal, 
administrative written request. Therefore, the Privacy Act should be 
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amended to ensure that government access to individual financial 
information from retail CBDC records is subject to the same  
procedural requirements. Additionally, more stringent liability 
provisions than those under the Privacy Act should be implemented  
for the unauthorized use, disclosure, and access of retail CBDC  
records. Regulatory compliance, such as currency transaction reports193 
and suspicious activity reports,194 necessitates some flexibility in the 
access to retail CBDC records. Therefore, the routine use exception 
could capture regulatory compliance under the BSA. Additionally, the 
Federal Reserve should provide actual notice to retail CBDC users 
about its information practices—such as the nature and extent of 
information sharing for regulatory purposes. The Privacy Act (or a  
new regulatory framework) must create a permissible vantage point for 
government actors and limit needlessly invasive information-sharing 
practices across government agencies. Failure to balance individual 
privacy expectations and government interests could discourage wide 
adoption of a retail CBDC, marginalize segments of the population, and 
erode public trust in the government. 
C. Equal Protection 
Motivations for a retail CBDC include reducing reliance on 
financial intermediaries and expanding access to capital. The plain  
text of the Privacy Act precludes protection for individuals who are not 
citizens or permanent residents of the United States. This would  
only serve to discourage and effectively exclude their participation  
in a retail CBDC system. The failure to extend protection to  
individuals who are not citizens or permanent residents—particularly 
undocumented immigrants—would undermine the trust and 
transparency in the system by maintaining a lawful workaround for 
inappropriate information practices. Additionally, it is antithetical to 
the CBDC goal of financial inclusion to further marginalize a  
segment of the US population for whom the private sector currently 
provides alternative means of access to the financial system.  
Therefore, it is imperative that the Privacy Act (or a new regulatory 
framework) expressly protects individuals who are not citizens or 
permanent residents of the United States. Additionally, the  
privacy framework governing CBDC records should incorporate a  
rule similar to the IRS’s policy and prohibit the disclosure of an 
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individual’s immigration status, which may be revealed or  
speculated from Know Your Customer procedures or retail CBDC 
transaction data. 
D. Innovative Regulatory Compliance and Oversight 
Retail CBDC has the potential to transform financial regulatory 
compliance and enforcement. A retail CBDC’s panoramic view of 
financial transactions could enable the creation of non-fungible 
money.195 Monetary policy can be implemented in a CBDC to impose 
conditions, such as spending limits on “helicopter money.”196 Helicopter 
money is a form of quantitative easing that involves a monetary 
authority distributing central bank money directly to the population in 
lieu of money distribution by financial intermediaries.197 For instance, 
the Federal Reserve could utilize a retail CBDC for helicopter money to 
more effectively ensure that households have access to government 
stimulus funds during the ongoing pandemic or any other economic 
crisis.198 The ability to control money in a retail CBDC system would 
not only aid monetary policy but also enable regulators to implement 
more risk-based approaches to BSA enforcement. Therefore, the privacy 
framework of a retail CBDC must strike a proper balance between 
innovative financial regulation and individual privacy. This should 
involve implementing tiered access to CBDC records such that 
individual information is not indiscriminately disclosed to government 
actors.199 A tiered access approach to disclosure could be captured under 
procedural requirements for government access to individual records 
and the routine use exception under the Privacy Act. The nature of the 
disclosure should implicate which requirement or exception is 
warranted. For example, if a government entity is seeking individual 
information in pursuit of a legitimate law enforcement purpose,  
then permissible means enumerated under the RFPA—such as a 
subpoena—should govern the disclosure. On the other hand, the 
Federal Reserve may aid the FinCEN under the BSA by providing 
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insights from retail CBDC records not tied to an individual identity via 
the routine use exception.   
IV. REIMAGINING THE US PRIVACY FRAMEWORK FOR A RETAIL CBDC 
The increased digital transformation of payments creates 
unique privacy demands. Though a retail CBDC has the promise to 
transform the way in which individuals transact, it must respect 
privacy limits. The Privacy Act of 1974 is a legal solution that could 
balance privacy in a retail CBDC. Alternatively, a new regulatory 
framework informed by the Privacy Act and aforementioned 
refinements to the Act in Parts I and II could be instituted to more 
effectively protect personal data in a retail CBDC system. Whether the 
Privacy Act is applied (and amended) or a new regulatory framework is 
adopted to protect retail CBDC records will largely depend on future 
insights from ongoing exploration of the technology, benefits and risks, 
and governance of a US retail CBDC. Moreover, the privacy framework 
governing a retail CBDC should (1) classify CBDC records as a database 
(or “system of records”), (2) prescribe permissible uses of retail CBDC 
records, particularly as it concerns government information-sharing 
practices of retail CBDC data, (3) impose similar procedural 
requirements to those under the RFPA for government access to 
individual CBDC records, (4) impose more stringent liability provisions 
than those under the Privacy Act for the misuse of retail CBDC data, 
(5) expressly protect individuals who are neither US citizens nor 
permanent residents, and (6) provide flexibility for innovative 
regulatory compliance and enforcement. Notably, the distinctive 
features of a retail CBDC system may necessitate an entirely new 
framework to protect individual privacy in a retail CBDC.200 A new 
regulatory framework that incorporates remedies for shortcomings of 
the Privacy Act and addresses the emergence of new financial 
technologies would be more applicable and adaptable to innovations in 
payments.201 
A privacy framework that defines permissible parameters in  
the collection, access, and use of retail CBDC data would enhance  
public transparency and protect individuals while providing flexibility 
for legitimate law enforcement, financial regulation, and innovation. 
Balancing the inherent tension between privacy and transparency of 
user identity and transactions within a retail CBDC system under the 
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control of the Federal Reserve would facilitate the successful 
implementation of a widely accessible retail CBDC that embraces 
technological innovation and fosters financial inclusion. 
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